# Moral Status and the Direction of Duties (Simon Cabulea May)

Abstract

* **Simon discusses Gopal Sreenivasan’s “Hybrid Theory” which states that a moral duty is directed toward an individual because her interests justify the assignment of control over the duty.**
* **He also discusses Razian “plain theory” which states that an individual’s interests justify the duty itself.**
* **He *argues* that a “strong moral status constraint” explains Sreenivasan’s “instrumentalization objection” to a Razian plain theory.**
* **Also, that Sreenivasan’s model violates this constraint as well.**
* **Simon then suggests how both approaches could be reformulated to satisfy the constraint.**
* **Following that, he argues that the reformulated plain theory can avoid an objection from insufficiency. Hybrid theory would then, in his argument, have no clear advantage over plain theory.**

Body

P1

* A duty – “Involve at least a two-place relation between an agent (‘the subject’) and an action (the ‘content’).
* Directed duties involve a three-place relation between an agent, an action and a party to whom the duty is owed (the “object”).
* Direction in this sense relies on the distinction between “wrongdoing” and “wronging.”
* It is possible to owe a particular duty to multiple parties, and in order to find any “normative significance” it is necessary to impose some constraints on the “direction relation.”

P2

* We compare here two approaches to direction of moral duties: hybrid theory and plain theory.
* Both assert that an individual is the object of a moral duty in virtue of the distinctive justificatory role played by her interests, but differ about which normative relation these interests justify.
* In plain theory, the object’s interests justify the duty itself.
* Hybrid theory states that the object’s interests justify the assignment of control over the duty.

P2 part 2 – THESIS STATEMENT & Signposts

* Simon finds that the hybrid approach has no clear advantage over the plain approach, that Sreenivasan draws the wrong inference from the failure of the Razian plain theory to satisfy the strong complaint.
* What is key here is to not switch from the justification of a duty to the justification of control over the duty (what the object’s interests justify). Instead we should identify a form of justification that satisfies the constraint—how the object’s interests justify some duty.

P3 –Limitations